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RECENT DECISIONS
not be affected by the manner in which the parties treat it.2 Plaintiff,
therefore, could not rely on section 67 of the Personal Property Law 8
to overcome the conditional vendor's reservation of title, since, by the
judicial classification already referred to, gas ranges when attached
to the realty in the usual manner do not become a "part thereof." In
order for the plaintiff to succeed, the doctrine of the Cohen case 4
was necessarily invoked. There a mortgagee whose mortgage con-
tained a personalty clause covering all chattels used in connection with
the mortgaged premises, was held to be a purchaser in good faith
within the statute,5 and as such prevailed over the conditional vendor
whose bill of sale, though prior in time to the mortgage, had not been
filed. In the instant case, the Court concluded that the transaction
consisted of a purchase of the chattels, as independent of the realty,
in the reduction of the purchase price because of the failure of the
builder to install certain specified fixtures. This was held to be an
indication that a definite portion of the purchase money was given as
payment for the furnishings necessary to finish the house according
to contract. The installation of gas ranges was clearly contemplated
by the phrase "in a fashion similar to buildings of the same type in
said location," and hence plaintiff was a purchaser in good faith for
value without notice and as such comes within the protection of the
statute 6 and must prevail over the conditional seller whose bill of
sale was not filed.
J.V.M.
CRIMEs-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW PROFESSIONAL
CRIMINALITY.-The indictment charged the defendant with the crime
of murder in the first degree. The deceased and three other men
were at work repairing an automobile on the street and defendant's
wife claimed that one of them had insulted her. Defendant was
enraged and threatened "to bump them all off." After arming him-
self with a pistol at his apartment, he returned to the scene, where
words and blows were followed by a shot which killed the deceased.
Defendant then threw the pistol in the river. In a confession, he
sought to justify the homicide by saying he had been threatened by
the deceased with a monkey-wrench. Upon the trial, the prosecution
was permitted to prove that at the time of the homicide and arrest
defendant possessed other weapons which were received in evidence.
No claim was made that any of them had been used by the defendant.
Cross-examination brought out the fact that the defendant had no
2McRea v. Central National Bank of Troy, 66 N. Y. 469 (1876).
'Laws of 1922, ch. 642, art. 2.
'Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Avenue Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929);(1929) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 131.
'N. Y. Personal Property Law, sec. 65.
'Supra Note 5.
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license to carry a pistol. On appeal from a judgment of conviction,
Held, reversed and new trial ordered. The admission of proof of
possession of other weapons for the purpose of showing a murderous
disposition constituted error which was not cured because cross-
examination disclosed defendant had no license for a pistol. The
jury should have been instructed that possession of the weapons had
significance only insofar as possession without a license had a ten-
dency to cast a shadow on defendant's character, and so to impair
the faith to be given to his word. People v. Zackowitz, 254 N. Y.
192, 172 N. E. 466 (1930).
In the dissenting opinion of Pound, J., in which Crane and
Hubbs, JJ., concur, it is urged that the proof elicited was part of the
history of the case, having a distinct relation to and bearing upon
the facts connected with the killing. The fact that possession of the
weapons constituted another distinct crime did not render the evi-
dence inadmissible. Moreover, since the defendant had in his con-
fession, which was received without objection, admitted owning the
weapons at the time of the killing, the evidence which corroborated
the confession on that point was also admissible as they both related
to the crime charged in the indictment.
When the defendant in a criminal case takes the stand in his
own behalf, he occupies a double position; as a defendant, his char-
acter cannot initially be attacked by the prosecution; as a witness, it
can be.' In introducing circumstantial evidence as bearing upon the
character of a defendant, the important inquiry is whether it is
relevant. If it is irrelevant, it does not come in at all; if relevant, it
may nevertheless be excluded because of undue prejudice.2 The
reason for the rule is found in the tendency of human nature to
punish not because a victim is guilty but because he is a bad man and
may well be condemned now that he is caught. 3 Resort may not be
had to past acts of a defendant for the purpose of fastening guilt
upon him but to evidence character, design, motive or some other
quality, and through that quality to infer that it led to the act charged.4
On the other hand, evidence of the murderous propensity of the
victim of the homicide is admissible when the issue is self-defense,
the defendant being confined to proof of general reputation. 5 In the
instant case, the evidence which was sought to be barred had the
tendency to withdraw and mislead the attention of the jury from the
real issue under inquiry and subjected the accused to charges con-
nected with that issue against which he had no reason to prepare. 6
Proof of the purchase of a weapon in contemplation of a crime is
1 1 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 61.
2 Id., secs. 42, 55.
'Id., sec. 57.
'Id., sec. 192; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901).
People v. Druse, 103 N. Y. 655, 8 N. E. 733 (1886) ; People v. Rodawald,
177 N. Y. 408, 70 N. E. 1 (1904) ; szapra Note 1 at secs. 63, 246.
'People v. Richardson, 222 N. Y. 103, 109, 110, 118 N. E. 514 (1917);
People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 461, 14 N. E. 319 (1887).
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competent as tending to show preparation and thus bearing upon
premeditation and guilt.7 The defendant, by offering himself as a
witness, subjected himself to interrogation as to any vicious or crimi-
nal act of his life for the purpose of impeaching his character and
credibility as a witness. 8 Where his credibility is assailed by com-
pelling him upon cross-examination to give testimony which, although
competent for the purpose of impeachment, is collateral to the main
issue, the prosecution, at whose instance the collateral evidence was
elicited, is bound thereby and has no right to contradict it.9 It is
then the province and duty of the trial court to clearly state the
limitations of the scope of such evidence and the application to be
observed by counsel and jury.10
In the circumstances of this case, the dissenting opinion ques-
tions whether the evidence, even if technically objectionable, so influ-
enced the jury against the defendant that justice requires a new
trial, and expresses the view that whether the defendant had one
weapon or a dozen would not materially change the nature of his
offense. As pointed out by the prevailing opinion, however, it is
essential, in order to assure to a defendant a fair trial, that well-
established principles regulating the orderly procedure of trial be
observed, for the question of whether a guilty man goes free or not
in a criminal prosecution is a small matter compared with the main-
tenance of those principles which safeguard a person accused of
a crime.
R.L.
CRIMES-MURDER-WHETHER A CONFESSION IS VOLUNTARY IS
A QUESTION OF LAw.-Defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree. Prosecution relied on defendant's confession to estab-
lish his guilt. The defense was an alibi and convincing evidence was
offered to show that the confession was entirely involuntary and
extracted by means of threats and severe physical violence. This evi-
dence was only partially denied and wholly uncontroverted. The
question on appeal was whether, where the weight of the evidence is
that the confession is involuntary, the jury should be left to determine
whether the confession was voluntary. Held, reversed. People v.
Barbarto, 254 N. Y. 170, 172 N. E. 458 (1930).
The practice of forcing confessions from defendants in criminal
actions, or the commonly-called "third degree" has been a well-
"People v. Scott, 153 N. Y. 40, 46 N. E. 1028 (1897); supra Note 1 at
sec. 238.
'People v. Hinksman, 192 N. Y. 421, 85 N. E. 676 (1908); People v.
Webster, 139 N. Y. 73, 34 N. E. 730 (1893).
' Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 176. 13 Am. Rep. 492 (1873); People v.
De Garmo, 179 N. Y. 130, 134, 71 N. E. 736 (1904).
"o People v. Webster, supra Note 8.
